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DIVINE FREEDOM AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 
Theodore Guleserian 
The traditional theistic philosopher is committed to hold that God has a 
perfect will essentially, and that this is better than having a free will. It will 
be argued that God, being omnipotent, would have the power to create 
creatures who also have a perfect will essentially. This creates a problem 
for the traditional theist in solving the problem of moral evil. The problem 
of actual moral evil will not then be solvable by reference to the value of our 
moral freedom, in accordance with the Free Will Defense. This favors the 
view that moral freedom is an excellence in both man and God. 
There is a certain nontraditional conception of divinity, call it the 
nonAnselmian conception, according to which a perfect being has moral 
freedom essentially, i.e., has essentially the power to choose between doing 
right and doing wrong. This conception implies that it is impossible for a 
perfect being to be morally perfect essentially.1 On the nonAnselmian con-
ception, God can do wrong acts.2 This is intolerable to the traditional theis-
tic philosopher, and this conception would be rejected unless some strong 
reason is provided to accept it over the traditional conception. J believe 
that there are strong reasons, one of which I shall endeavor to develop 
here: the assumption that God's freely chosen conformance to the moral 
law is a greater excellence than God's essential conformance to the moral 
law renders the Free Will Defense more plausible. 
I 
Consider the property PW - for perfection of the will - that x has just in 
case, for every situation 5 and act A, whenever x believes both that he or 
she is in situation 5 and that he or she has the power to do act A in situa-
tion 5 and believes that the moral law requires that anyone who is both in 5 
and has the power to do A in 5 ought to do A, x wills to do A.3 Having PW 
is not sufficient for having moral perfection in the full sense, but on any 
plausible account of moral perfection in the full sense, PW is a property 
that is included in (i.e., entailed by) moral perfection. PW is contrasted 
with PC, i.e., perfect conformance of outward action with the moral law. 
PC is the property that x has if and only if whenever x is in situation 5 and 
x has the power to do act A in 5, and the moral law requires that anyone 
who is both in 5 and has the power to do A in 5 ought to do A, x does A. 
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PC is not sufficient for moral perfection either. It is logically possible for 
a person to have PC quite by accident. A person's actions might conform 
to the moral law in spite of his or her intention to do great wrong. A doc-
tor, in an attempt to secretly murder his wife, might inject her with a poi-
son which in fact cures her of a fatal disease that she had acquired 
unknown to both of them. We can even imagine a comic character who 
always aims at doing a morally wrong act but who, due to peculiar circum-
stances, always fails - and does what the moral law requires. If we knew 
of this person's intentions and were to attempt to judge him as a moral 
being, I think that we ought not to judge him as being morally virtuous. 
Moral perfection in the full sense demands that one will or choose or 
intend to do what one believes that the moral law requires. Moral perfec-
tion in the full sense might be called perfect intentional conformance with the 
moral law, or PIC for short. PIC entails both PC and PW, which jointly 
entail PIC. PW is in fact a perfection of the will, which lies at the heart of 
moral perfection. A person who has PW may, from lack of moral or factual 
knowledge or (on some views) from lack of the requisite power, fail to do 
what is right; but such a person will never intentionally do a wrong act 
while believing that it is wrong. PW is, in my judgment, much more 
important than PC as a moral property in terms of which to evaluate any 
person as a moral being. 
I know there are those who would claim that PW without PC is no bet-
ter, no greater virtue, than PC without PW. We can imagine a counterpart 
of the above mentioned comic character: a tragic person who has PW but 
who, due to peculiar circumstances and/or defects in his cognitive facul-
ties, always has moral volitions to do acts which he incorrectly believes to 
be right. Some would say that such a tragic character who has PW would 
be no more morally virtuous than the aforementioned comic character who 
has Pc. After all, Hitler might have sincerely believed that his attempted 
genocide was morally right; he may have sincerely believed that the Jews 
were parasites on the German economy, as he claimed. But surely his voli-
tions to act on these sincere beliefs brought him no moral virtue; rather 
they were morally disastrous, i.e., not only disastrous to others but disas-
trous to him as a moral being. 
I believe that persons who think along these lines may be overlooking 
the fact that the Hitlers of this world have the duty to investigate their 
claims before acting on them, such as Hitler's claim just referred to, which 
they usually fail to do. Such a failure is a moral failure, since their moral 
volitions depend on their beliefs, and the correctness of their choices 
depends upon the veracity of those beliefs. For whatever other reasons 
such persons may not have PW, they fail to have PW due to their moral 
negligence with respect to their duties to thoroughly investigate their 
important moral beliefs - especially those that will have significant social 
impact. We can correctly blame them for refraining from those investiga-
tions which would at least have made them doubt that their claims are true 
and hence would have given them reason to refrain from those morally 
disastrous volitions. 
But let us suppose that there is a tragic character who does investigate 
and does take great precautions to do the right thing in every case, but who 
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because of defects in his cognitive faculties comes to believe just such wild-
ly false claims as those of Hitler and other racists. We are to imagine that 
he is simply incapable of arriving at the relevant moral and factual truths 
before deciding what to do, and is incapable of discovering that his facul-
ties are defective. This person has PW but wills and does what is in fact 
wrong every time. While nothing in my central argument depends on this 
point, in my judgment this tragic figure still has a moral virtue precisely 
because he is aiming at what is right. We can correctly say that he is attempt-
ing to do what is right but is failing due to a defect that is not of his own mak-
ing. We could not say these things about the comic counterpart who has 
PC accidentally. Rather, we would have to say that the comic character is 
attempting to do what is wrong but is failing due to lucky circumstances that 
are not of his own making. None of this is intended to deny the great 
importance of PC when conjoined to PW. A perfect being would, of 
course, have PC as well as PW. 
Now, each of the three properties, PC, PW, and PIC, have essential, free, 
and causal counterparts. Essential PW is just the property of having PW 
essentially. Free PW is the property that x has just in case, for every situa-
tion 5 and act A, whenever x believes that he or she is in situation 5 and has 
the power to do A in 5, and believes that the moral law requires that anyone 
who is both in 5 and has the power to do A in 5 ought to do A, x freely wills 
to do A. That x has free PW entails that x has PW as a contingent (i.e., 
nonessential) property. There could be an individual who has moral freedom 
essentially, but there could not be an individual who has free PWessential-
ly. That is because the freedom of one who has free PW requires that this 
person freely wills to do a wrong act in some possible worlds. Causal PW is 
the property that x has just in case, for every situation 5 and act A, the state 
of affairs that x believes that he or she is in 5 and has the power to do A and 
believes that anyone who is both in 5 and has the power to do A ought to 
do A causes under standard conditions the state of affairs that x wills to do A. 
Causal PW itself can be possessed either essentially or contingently. Both 
contingent causal PW and essential causal PW will be discussed in section II 
below. It may be needless to say that on the libertarian concept of freedom 
assumed by the Free Will Defense, free PW is incompatible with causal PW 
and hence with both contingent and essential causal PW. 
Now, the traditional theistic philosopher is committed to hold that God 
has essential PW, i.e., that he has PW essentially. On his view, it is better 
that God has PW essentially than that God has PW contingently - as God 
would if God had free PW, which he would have if God freely chose to do 
the right thing every time. This is due to the fact that, according to the tra-
ditional view, the property of having essential PW is a greater excellence 
than the property of having free PW. But then it should be true for any 
moral agent who can have essential PW that it would be a greater excel-
lence for that agent to have PW essentially than to have it freely and hence 
contingently. This raises an important question: does God have the power 
to create creatures that have PW essentially instead of creatures like us 
who (at best) can have PW contingently? There seems to be just two possi-
ble answers: (i) he does have this power; (ii) he does not have this power 
because such creatures are impossible to create, i.e., while it is possible for 
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God to have PW essentially, it is not possible for a creature to have PW 
essentially. 
The second answer requires some investigation. Let's beat around the 
neighboring bushes. What kinds of individuals are beyond God's power to 
create? Well, at least we know that, on the traditional conception of God, he 
can't create another perfect being, because a perfect being has the attribute 
of necessary independent existence - a property which no created being 
could have. Could God create another omnipotent individual? It is impos-
sible for there to exist two omnipotent individuals whose wills conflict. But 
if God has middle knowledge, could he not foresee which possible omnipo-
tent individuals would always in fact conform their will to his? Couldn't he 
choose to create just those omnipotent individuals? I don't know, but I don't 
see a reason to deny that he could.4 When it comes to the question of creat-
ing individuals that are omniscient, there is even less reason to doubt that 
he could create them, because there seems to be no possible conflict that 
could arise between two omniscient individuals that would be due to their 
shared omniscience - even two persons who are essentially omniscient, say, 
God and an essentially omniscient angel. But let's not try to answer these 
questions; instead, let's just restrict our range of possible creatures to essen-
tially finite creatures, who due to their essential finitude cannot be omnipo-
tent and cannot be omniscient. About such creatures it is possible to justify 
at least a belief that none could have essential PC and hence none could have 
essential PIC, i.e., none could have essentially the property of being inten-
tionally in conformance with the moral law. 
The argument is straightforward. For any possible finite person, there 
are some possible worlds in which that person is in a situation S in which 
the moral law requires that person to do a certain act A, but in which she 
does not believe that she is in S or does not believe that the moral law 
requires her to do A in S. In some of these worlds, the person chooses to 
refrain from doing A and hence fails to act in accordance with the moral 
law. It follows that such a person cannot have essential PC and hence can-
not have essential PIC either. Such a person cannot exhibit (intentional or 
unintentional) perfect conformance with the moral law in every world in 
which she exists. 
The same sort of argument, however, will not work to show that no 
finite creature could have essential PW. A creature that has an essentially 
perfect will need not be omniscient or omnipotent or have any infinite 
attribute that is traditionally thought to be unique to God; one does not 
need these attributes in order to have one's factual and moral beliefs meta-
physically determine or necessitate one's acts of will about moral matters, 
as they are in God's case on the traditional conception. To be sure, a crea-
ture's factual and moral belief types will be finite in number, have a finite 
range; its volition types will likewise deal with a finite range of act types. 
But on the assumption that it is really possible for a divine being to have 
moral and factual beliefs that metaphysically necessitate its moral voli-
tions, there seems to be no reason to suppose that the same may not be true 
of a creature; there seems to be no incompatibility between being a finite 
individual and having one's finite volitions metaphysically necessitated by 
one's finite factual and moral beliefs. To oversimplify, what is required is 
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that when one has the power to believe that it would be wrong for one to 
do an act, one has the power to will to refrain from doing it; i.e., the voli-
tion must be within the range of one's potential volitions if the moral belief 
is in the range of one's potential moral beliefs. Neither range need be infi-
nite, as great as God's. Hence, there seems to be no logical barrier for an 
omnipotent being to create a finite spirit who is designed to have its moral 
intentions and moral acts of will metaphysically determined by its moral 
and factual beliefs, just as God's are according to the traditional view. God 
can create finite spirits who possess essentially the capacity to think and to 
believe, and who possess essentially the capacity to will and to form inten-
tions regarding moral acts, just as God possesses. Surely, then, on the tra-
ditionalist assumption that there is one individual whose moral volitions 
are metaphysically necessitated by his beliefs, viz., God, and therefore that 
it is possible for moral and factual beliefs to metaphysically necessitate 
moral volitions, it is plausible to suppose that it is possible for God to cre-
ate others in his own image: God could create finite spirits who possess 
essentially the property of always willing in accordance with their moral 
beliefs. I don't believe that this result is provable, but it certainly seems to 
me to be plausible, on the traditionalist assumption we are making. 
One might be tempted to reject the above line of reasoning on the 
grounds that, besides having such properties as omnipotence and omni-
science which finite individuals cannot possess, God has such special prop-
erties as being totally perfect and necessarily existent, which creatures cannot 
have. Perhaps having essential PW depends in some wayan having these 
special properties. Essential PW is itself a perfection; if creatures cannot be 
perfect perhaps they cannot have essential PW. I have two comments to 
make about this line of thought. The first is that although creatures cannot 
have the property of being totally perfect, this would not prevent the possi-
bility of their having some perfections. Even though on the present view the 
property of essential PW is itself a perfection and can be possessed by finite 
creatures, none of these creatures could have it in connection with an infinite 
range of beliefs or an infinite range of moral volitions. On the present view, 
none of these creatures could have the combined property comprising all 
these features. So, the present view does not endanger the proper distinction 
between a perfect being and a finite creature. 
The second comment requires a thought experiment. It is sometimes 
remarked by mathematicians that "God made the natural numbers and 
man made all the rest." The point of this remark is not truly a theological 
one but only a reflection of the view that we can use the natural numbers 
to define other numbers. Just to fix an idea, however, let us suppose that 
the numbers really are contingent objects created by God. So God created 
7, and 5. But it is, I think, even under this assumption, overwhelmingly 
plausible to suppose that God could not have made it the case that 5 is 
greater than 7, or that the sum of 7 and 5 is 5. In other words, even if these 
objects are contingent, as long as they exist their basic relations to each 
other must remain the same. For example, even if 5 and 7 are contingently 
existing objects, it would remain true that 5 is essentially less than 7.5 
There are essential properties of each number, then, that relate the given 
number to other numbers which the given number would have even if that 
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number were a contingent object. Adding necessary existence to each 
number would not alter the fact that each number has just those essential 
properties. Similarly, taking away necessary existence from each number 
would not alter the fact that each number has just those essential proper-
ties. There is no reason to think that the matter is different with an object 
having PW essentially. Whether it has necessary existence or not seems to 
be irrelevant to whether its moral and factual beliefs are necessarily related 
to its moral volitions by metaphysically necessitating them. An object that 
has essential PW might exist necessarily or might exist contingently: that 
its moral volitions are metaphysically necessitated by its moral and factual 
beliefs does not seem to entail that it has necessary existence. In fact, it 
seems that even if God's existence should be contingent - as some have 
maintained - he could still have PW essentially. Nothing about having 
essential PW seems to require having necessary existence. 
While it is probably impossible to prove it, the first answer to our ques-
tion, then, seems to be right: on the traditionalist assumption that God him-
self has PW essentially, and that consequently it is possible for moral and 
factual beliefs jointly to metaphysically necessitate moral volitions, God 
does have the power to create creatures who have PW essentially. On the 
assumptions that God is necessarily existent and essentially omnipotent 
and omniscient, it seems to follow that God has this power in every possible 
world. Unlike the case of creatures who have moral freedom, the moral free-
dom of these essentially PW creatures cannot prevent this result from being 
true, because creatures who have essential PW have no moral freedom. 
As we have noted, having essential PW does not require having infi-
nite powers or infinite knowledge. But in fact, there seems to be no logi-
cal barrier to an omnipotent, omniscient being providing finite spirits 
who have essential PW with sufficient finite moral and factual knowl-
edge to cover all those moral situations that he knows they will confront, 
so that these spirits would in fact exhibit a perfect (albeit limited) confor-
mance to the moral law, as well as having essential PW. In other words, 
God could create such creatures and provide them with sufficient moral 
and factual knowledge to cause them to have PC as well as PW. These 
creatures would have PC as a contingent (nonessential) property only if 
there are other possible worlds in which God creates them but does not 
directly or indirectly cause them to have the requisite finite knowledge. 
We need not decide the issue of whether this possibility exists. The 
important point is that apparently God has the power in any initial world 
segment6 to create finite creatures that have both PW and PC, i.e., who 
exhibit PIC - perfect intentional conformance to the moral law. 
This creates a problem, however, for the traditional theist in solving the 
problem of actual moral evil. If God could have avoided the intentional 
wrongdoing in this world of morally free creatures by actualizing instead a 
world of better creatures - who have more excellence by virtue of having 
PW essentially, - it would seem that he ought to have done so. By addi-
tionally supplying these creatures with all the factual and moral knowledge 
they would need to achieve PC, he would thereby have both avoided the 
intentional wrongdoing of this world and created more excellent creatures 
as well. The problem of actual moral evil will not then be solvable by refer-
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ence to the value of our moral freedom, in accordance with the Free Will 
Defense. The fact, pointed out by Plantinga, that it is logically possible that 
even an omnipotent God does not have the power to create a single free 
creature who would be morally perfect, would be irrelevant to the problem 
of actual moral evil. For if it should be the case that God was in that situa-
tion in this world, he would have the alternative of creating these more 
excellent nonfree creatures having essential PW. So, the Free Will Defense, 
when deployed to solve the problem of actual moral evil, seems to presup-
pose not only that moral creatures are free but that a world of creatures that 
always intentionally but non freely conform to the moral law is not a better 
world than a world like this one, in which morally free creatures sometimes 
do great wrongs. The value of moral freedom and the significance it brings 
to our actions compensates for those moral evils, according to the Free Will 
Defense. The truth of this proposition favors the nonAnselmian conception 
of God over that of the traditional theistic philosopher. 
II 
No doubt many traditional theists would answer that I have oversimpli-
fied the role of freedom in the Free Will Defense. The Defense assumes 
only that a world of creatures who intentionally but nonfreely conform to 
the moral law is not better than this free world if those creatures are causal-
ly determined to will as they do. The traditional view, they would insist, is 
that free PW is better than causal PW, but that essential PW is better than free 
PW. We must now consider in tum contingent causal PW and essential 
causal PW to assess the traditional view just expressed. 
Now, it is clear why the traditionalists consider it to be true from their 
point of view that essential PW is a greater excellence than contingent causal 
PW: that x has contingent causal PW entails that it is metaphysically possible 
for x to intentionally will to do a wrong act. In other words, contingent 
causal PW is a metaphysically contingent property; so if someone has contin-
gent causal PW in one world, there are other possible worlds in which she 
lacks it. It is generally considered to be a defect of an excellence that one 
could lack it; better to have that excellence essentially. I have attacked this 
traditional assumption elsewhere and I won't stop to repeat my argument 
against it now? What I want to point out is that even if we accept this tradi-
tional axiom about excellences, there is still no explanation for the thesis that 
free PW is better than contingent causal PW. Free PW is just as much a con-
tingent property as contingent causal PW; like contingent causal PW, if 
someone has free PW in one world there are other possible worlds in which 
she lacks it. So, if this is a defect, it is one that does not make contingent 
causal PW less of an excellence than free PW, which shares it. 
Indeed, with respect to insuring the right result, contingent causal PW is 
more like essential PW than is free PW. If a person has contingent causal 
PW, the insurance that she wills in accordance with her moral and factual 
beliefs stems from the fact that her having these beliefs causes her to have 
her moral volitions; if a person has essential PW, the insurance stems from 
the fact that his having his beliefs entails that he has his moral volitions. 
Both relations guarantee that the agent has volitions that conform to his or 
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her moral and factual beliefs. Free PW offers no such guarantee; if a per-
son has free PW, she mayor may not have volitions that conform to her 
moral and factual beliefs. It looks as though a rational creature would be 
more like the traditionalist's God if the creature has contingent causal PW 
than if she has free PW. So, what makes free PW better than contingent 
causal PW on the traditional view? I can't help thinking that the tradition-
alist's stance on this matter is opaque to reason. 
It seems that there is a property that is even more like essential PW than 
contingent causal PW. Perhaps in some cases causal powers can be essen-
tial properties of the objects that have them. For example, perhaps the 
causal power of a proton to attract an electron is essential to it, so that if pis 
essentially a proton in this (the real) world and in some possible world an 
object failed to attract a nearby electron under the standard conditions (in this, 
the real, world8) for protons attracting electrons, that object could not be p. 
Similarly, there could be a spiritual individual (or even a species of such 
individuals) that has causal PW as an essential property. Let's take 'a' to be 
the name of such an individual, 'S' to be the name of a situation (state of 
affairs), and 'A' to be the name of an act which a has the power to will to 
do. By virtue of having PW, a satisfies statements of the following sort: a's 
believing both (i) that he or she is in S and has the power to do A, and (ii) 
that anyone who is both in S and has the power to do A ought to do A, 
causes under certain standard conditions a's volition to do A. 
Using 'B' for 'the belief in both (i) and (ii),' and using 'V' for 'the volition 
to do A,' we can say that a's having B causes under certain standard condi-
tions a's having V. The relevant standard conditions may be nothing more 
than the state of affairs that an omnipotent being such as God does nothing 
to prevent a's having V when a has B. Now, if a has causal PW essentially, 
every possible world in which a has B under the relevant standard condi-
tions is one in which a has V. In other words, that a has B under the rele-
vant standard conditions entails that a has V. This means that while a's 
having B does not by itself entail a's having V, a's having B under certain 
standard conditions does entail a's having V. This entailment does not hold 
for contingent causal PW. If a has contingent causal PW in the real world, 
there will be other worlds in which a has B under the standard conditions 
for causing a's having V such that in those other worlds a fails to have V. 
So, essential PW is not essential causal PW. If a has essential PW, a's 
having B just by itself would entail a's having V. If a has essential causal 
PW, the entailment of a's having V requires both that a has B and that the 
relevant standard conditions obtain. In case a has just contingent causal 
PW, even the conjlmctive state of affairs that a has B and the relevant stan-
dard conditions obtain is not sufficient to realize the entailment of a's hav-
ing V. It is evident, then, that essential causal PW is more like essential PW 
than contingent causal PW is like essential PW. We have already noted 
that contingent causal PW is more like essential PW than free PW is like 
essential PW. So it should not be surprising that essential causal PW is 
much more like essential PW than free PW is like essential PW. 
The traditional theist would have us believe that God has essential PW 
on the grounds that this property is a greater excellence than any of the 
other forms of PW. The Anselmian and nonAnselmian can probably agree 
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that a divine (perfect) being would not have PW as a causal property. The 
traditional Anselmian would insist that in God's case, God's having B 
entails God's having V - without it being true that God's having B causes 
under any conditions God's having V. For various reasons, the intrinsic 
states of a divine person would not be causally related to each other. 
Presumably God is not subject to contingent causal laws even if he creates 
all contingent causal laws himself.9 
In section I above I maintained that it is plausible to suppose that if it is 
possible that God has essential PW, it is also possible for God to create other 
individuals that have essential PW. But even if this should not be true -
even if we assume that God has essential PW but that no creature can possi-
bly have essential PW - it seems that on the traditionalist's assumption 
that essential PW is a greater excellence than free PW, essential causal PW 
would be a greater excellence than free PW precisely because essential causal PW is 
much more like essential PW than free PW is like essential PW. In other words, 
an individual that has causal PW as an essential property is more like the 
traditionalist's God than is an individual that has free PW. The greater sim-
ilarity of essential causal PW renders it highly implausible for the tradition-
alist to maintain that while essential PW is a greater excellence than free 
PW, free PW is nevertheless a greater excellence than essential causal PW. 
The traditionalist would no doubt be quick to point out that there are 
relevant ways in which essential PW is more like free PW than like essen-
tial causal PW, and he could argue as follows. One crucial similarity is a 
kind of autonomy. Both God's volitions and the volitions of creatures with 
free PW are never determined from anything outside themselves. But when 
God creates creatures who have essential causal PW, God in effect deter-
mines that they have the right volitions (or at least ones they believe are 
right). The source of their right volitions thus lie outside themselves. So, 
the autonomy of creatures who freely will what is right more adequately 
mirrors this aspect of God's volitions than the volitions of creatures with 
essential causal PW.lO 
Now, autonomy, or independence, is indeed a relevant and important 
feature, and I think there is some truth to this claim of the similarity of 
essential and free PW. But with respect to autonomy there are some crucial 
differences as well. First, one kind of autonomy of volitions is independence 
from the agent's other inner states. The volitions of a free being are not 
causally or metaphysically determined by, and hence are independent of, 
any of his other inner states, whereas the volitions of a being with either 
essential PW or essential causal PW are determined by some of his other 
inner states. This difference leads us to a much more crucial difference: if 
God has essential PW, God's volitions are not always and necessarily 
autonomous in the sense claimed by the above traditionalist - indepen-
dence from determining external factors; but the moral volitions of an indi-
vidual having free PW - at least if he has full-fledged moral freedom (such 
as we conceive ourselves to have) - are always autonomous in this sense. 
I'll explain this in terms of an example. Suppose that, as the traditional-
ist claims, God has essential PW. Suppose further that God is a temporal 
being and that he makes a promise to his moral creatures who have 
sinned: he promises, e.g., that all who truly and sincerely repent shall be 
DIVINE FREEDOM AND EVIL 357 
forgiven by him. Subsequent to his making this promise, one of these crea-
tures, Luke, freely and sincerely repents. And, of course, God then for-
gives Luke. Is not God's volition to forgive Luke determined by Luke's act? 
It seems to me for all the world that it is a consequence of the traditional-
ist view that God's volition is in this case determined by the external fact of 
Luke's act. Even if God knew before he ever made his promise and before 
he created Luke that he would put himself into this situation, the fact 
remains that at the moment of Luke's decision, it is in Luke's power to deter-
mine God's volition, that is, to do something that makes it impossible in 
these circumstances for God to will anything else." It is a consequence of the 
traditionalist view, then, that it is possible for the volitions of a temporal 
God to be subject to the will of anotherY This is a crucial and, in my judgment, 
telling difference between one who has free PW and one who has either 
essential PW or essential causal PW, the latter pair of properties being simi-
lar in this respect. On the other hand, if God (or anyone else) has as essen-
tial properties what I call the two grades of moral freedom - the power to 
freely choose between right and wrong, and the power to freely alter or 
freely retain one's previous moral intention up to the time of the act13 - it is 
impossible for him ever to be subject to the will of another. This difference, 
by itself, is reason enough (in my judgment) to prefer a conception of God as 
fully morally free over the traditional view. If complete autonomy is impor-
tant, one can find it only in a being that is fully free in the libertarian sense. 
These considerations lead, I believe, to the conclusion that, overall, the 
similarity of essential PW to essential causal PW is much greater than that 
of essential PW to free PW. There are some relevant similarities between 
essential and free PW which are not shared by essential causal PW, but 
these are more than compensated for by other crucial similarities between 
essential PW and essential causal PW not shared between essential PW 
and free PW, viz., the ones just pointed out. Again, the greater similarity of 
essential causal PW to essential PW makes it highly implausible for the tra-
ditionalist to hold that while essential PW is a greater excellence than free 
PW, free PW is nonetheless a greater excellence than essential causal PW. 
It is a consequence of the assumption that essential PW is more excellent 
than free PW that God could choose to make a more excellent creature 
than one with free PW by creating a creature with essential causal PW -
even if it should be impossible for him to create in his own image individu-
als with essential PW. And I think there can be little doubt that an 
omnipotent, omniscient being would have in any initial world segment the 
power to create individuals with essential causal PW. Thus, the problem 
identified in section I that the traditional assumption (that essential PW is a 
greater excellence than free PW) creates for the Free Will Defense is not dis-
solved simply by denying that creatures with essential PW are impossible. 
The same problem arises for creatures with essential causal PW as for crea-
tures with essential PW. Since creatures with essential causal PW are possi-
ble, God could have avoided the intentional wrongdoing which obtains in 
this world of morally free creatures by actualizing instead a world of better 
creatures who have essential causal PW. More specifically, by supplying 
these creatures with all the relevant knowledge required to achieve pc, and 
by insuring that the relevant standard conditions obtain, he would have 
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avoided all the wrongdoing in this world and created more excellent crea-
tures as well. So, if essential causal PW, like essential PW, is a greater 
excellence than free PW, the Free Will Defense, as a solution to the problem 
of actual moral evil, fails. 
III 
Be that as it may, perhaps those traditionalists who would accept the 
possibility of creatures having either essential PW or essential causal PW 
might retain the Free Will Defense. God is not morally obligated, they 
might say, to actualize a world of creatures that are more excellent by 
virtue of having essential PW instead of a worse world of morally free 
creatures. Robert M. Adams has famously argued that God need not be 
morally obligated to have created a better species than any lesser existing 
species, provided that certain minimal conditions are maintained with 
respect to the well-being of the existing lesser species.14 Why may not 
Adams' thesis be extended to cover whole universes? Just to make a point, 
suppose that God is an everlasting being, who exists in his own absolute 
time. Suppose further that each event in our 16 billion year old universe 
has an absolute temporal location in divine time. What was God doing 
during that infinite time stretch before our universe began? It is absurdly 
myopic to believe, that our universe is the only one. An omnipotent and 
omniscient being can be expected to be creating countless universes at each 
and every instant of divine time, for the infinite past and the infinite future. 
The actual world would contain all of these actual universes. Some of 
these may contain creatures that have PC as well as essential PW, and thus 
be morally better universes than ours. So God could have created another 
one of those instead of creating this universe. So what? As long as this 
universe has more good than evil and more moral good than moral evil, 
God has no obligation to avoid creating it, anymore than you or I have an 
obligation to avoid breeding stupid but pretty goldfish rather than, say, 
intelligent dogs or horses. Just for convenience, and certainly without 
imputing this view to Robert M. Adams, let's call this the Adams strategy. 
Well, I like the Adams strategy when it is a matter of justifying the cre-
ation of one species of creature over another. But I myself can't accept it 
when it is used to justify great moral evil. My basic thought is that there 
are some persons who have done deeds that are so morally wicked that 
they render themselves unworthy of existence. We are all struck by the 
depth and the finality of Christ's last words to Judas: "It would have been 
better for you if you had never been born." Whatever else Christ meant by 
this, it certainly seems to include a judgment about Judas' worth as a moral 
agent and as a child of God. We can say the same in this century about 
Hitler and Stalin, that by their own acts as moral agents they rendered 
themselves unworthy of existence. The degree of immorality that such 
men have committed leaves the earthly lives of these men in moral ruins, 
regardless of how much they themselves valued their lives. It is not that 
such men are beyond all redemption or that forgiveness is impossible. I 
believe that even if they were to be redeemed and forgiven, it would still 
be true that as moral agents they would be unworthy of existence, and it is 
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still true that it would have been better if the entire universe in which such 
men lived had never been created provided that another morally better 
universe housing only basically good people would have taken its place-
no matter how many such good universes there already were. 
This line of thought is easily dismissed - all too easily - on the basis of 
the principle that a creator is justified in creating any universe that has both 
more good than evil and more moral good than moral evil, as long as every 
evil is necessary to a greater good. I believe that this principle is false. The 
justifiability of the creation of a universe does not depend solely on the 
amount of good and evil in it, even if each evil is necessary to a greater good; 
it is not a wholly quantitative matter. And it is not a matter to be judged 
solely on the basis of properties intrinsic to the contemplated universe; the 
alternative possible universes available for creation are always relevant. 
Let us consider two possible universes, U1 and U2. In U1, every person 
commits some egregious moral evil (worth about 1,000 "turps", to use a 
Plantingan term), such as rape, enslavement, and the kidnaping and sale of 
children, but each person also manages to do enough moral good over a 
lifetime to just barely outweigh his or her own moral evil. In U2, every per-
son commits just one immoral act of a mildly reprehensible sort (worth just 
one "turp"), such as lying about one's weight to a prospective date, but each 
person also does many morally excellent acts anyone of which far out-
weighs his or her single moral evil. Further, let's stipulate that in each uni-
verse every evil is necessary to a greater good. Finally, let's suppose that 
each universe contains an infinite number of persons. Which universe is 
morally better? Mathematically speaking, they are of exactly equal value: 
each contains an infinite amount of moral good and an infinite amount of 
moral evil. And again mathematically speaking, each universe has the 
same balance of moral good over moral evil: infinity over infinity. But who 
among us would consider herself justified in choosing to create U1 instead 
of U2, if the choice were hers? Where U2 is an alternative available for cre-
ation, would not the choice to create U1 instead of U2 be morally wrong? 
What this example shows is that we do not evaluate universes and worlds 
simply in terms of the amount of moral good and moral evil they contain; 
we also look at what I must opaquely refer to as their overall moral character. 
As vague as this notion is, it is clear that the overall moral character of U2 is 
much better than that of U1, because the moral character of each person in 
U2 is better than the moral character of each person in U1. 
This qualitative aspect of the overall moral character of a universe is not 
tied strictly to cases involving infinitudes. Consider another pair of uni-
verses, U3 and U4, which are just like U1 and U2 respectively, except that 
their populations are both finite. However, the number of persons in the 
"morally challenged" U3 is 100 trillion, whereas the number of persons in 
morally excellent U4 is but 100 thousand. In this case, the quantitative 
measure of the net moral value (units of moral good minus turps) of U3 
might easily be greater than the quantitative measure of the net moral 
value of U4. This is due, not to the individual moral greatness of the per-
sons in U3 (whose individual moral worth is positive but very meager), 
but rather primarily to their vastly greater number. But who among us 
would choose to create U3 instead of U4? Which of us would choose to live 
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in U3 rather than U4? Again, it is clear that the overall moral character of 
U4 is much greater than that of U3 because in this idealized case the moral 
character of each person in U4 is so much better than the moral character of 
each person in U3. Of course, many comparisons of the overall moral char-
acters of different possible universes (and worlds) are not as clear as these 
ideal cases. The point, however, that such comparisons are not simply a 
function of quantities is important to questions about the justifiability of 
the creation of universes - in the main case we are considering, universes 
inhabited by moral monsters. 
My moral intuition here is not just that it would be better for a Creator to 
choose to make universes without moral monsters when a morally perfect 
universe could be made instead. My intuition is stronger than that. I think 
it would be morally wrong for a Creator to choose to create the moral mon-
ster provided that - and this is the crucial point - he had the alternative 
of creating a morally much better world, a world with a much better over-
all moral character, without such monsters. If having essential PW (or even 
just having essential causal PW) is better than having free PW, then God 
would always have available the better alternative in question. The alter-
native of creating a universe of creatures having essential PW (and giving 
them the knowledge they need to then achieve PC) renders both unneces-
sary and unjustifiable the existence of the universes with moral monsters. 
If this is correct, the traditional view that essential PW is a greater excel-
lence than free PW leads to a failure of the Free Will Defense. On the other 
hand, what if the traditional view is mistaken? Suppose that free PW is a 
greater excellence than essential PW. Then, the value of freedom can make 
a universe or an entire possible world containing free creatures better than 
a universe or world containing nonfree creatures who have both PC and 
essential PW. In that case, the best world that God has the power to create 
may be a free world which contains some moral monsters, and the Free 
Will Defense might succeed in solving the problem of actual moral evil. 
IV 
In this closing section I want to offer two other reasons for rejecting the 
traditional view that God is essentially morally perfect in favor of the 
nonAnselmian view that God is morally perfect by his own free choice. 
The first has to do with our modal intuitions. Put very briefly, it very 
much seems to me that just as it is metaphysically possible for there to be 
more natural good than natural evil, it is metaphysically possible for there 
to be more natural evil than natural good. And, just as it is metaphysically 
possible for it to be true that all moral creatures jointly do more moral good 
than moral evil, it is metaphysically possible for it to be true that all moral 
creatures jointly do more moral evil than moral good. In short, it seems to 
me that naturally and morally bad worlds are metaphysically possible. 
This modal intuition, however widely held, is inconsistent with the 
traditional view of God as a necessary being who essentially conforms to 
the moral law. On this view, these apparently possible bad worlds can-
not be metaphysically possible after all, since an essentially good God 
would not permit any of them to be actualized. So the traditional theist 
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must give up this modal intuition if he has it. But the nonAnselmian can 
preserve it, because on her view God has the moral freedom to choose 
between doing right and doing wrong. This entails that it is possible for 
God (or Yahweh) to do wrong acts, which allows for the possibility of his 
freely actualizing a bad world. IS 
The second reason I wish to offer here against the traditional view pre-
sents an even more serious problem for that view, and one that is more 
germane to the principle objection developed in sections I through III 
above. Thomas Morris describes one of two alternative views compatible 
with the traditional viewpoint as follows: 
"To be an agent such as God who freely engages in acts of grace or 
supererogation, but necessarily acts in accordance with moral princi-
ples, is to be in the greatest possible state of axiological goodness."16 
It will be instructive to approach the second reason I have in mind by first 
considering an objection to my own position outlined in sections I-III 
above, a traditionalist's objection which is based on the basic idea con-
tained in Morris' passage. 
The traditionalist might argue as follows. "Just because A is better than B, 
we cannot conclude that a world God creates with A will be better than a 
world God creates with B. And part of what traditional theists say is that 
God values more the love and worship of individuals with free PW than indi-
viduals with [essential PW or] essential causal PW. This is consistent with it 
being true that considered apart from one's relationship to God, an essential 
causal PW [or an essential PW] is a more excellent thing than a free PW."17 
In other words, suppose it is correct to conclude that since essential PW 
and even essential causal PW is more excellent than free PW, God could 
choose to make a more excellent creature than one with free PW by creat-
ing a creature with either essential PW or even essential causal PW. We 
cannot conclude from this that any world God creates with creatures hav-
ing essential PW or essential causal PW will be better overall than a world 
that God creates with creatures having free PW. One reason we cannot 
reach this conclusion is that God values freely given love and worship 
more than determined love and worship. As the passage from Morris 
quoted above implies, when it comes to supererogatory matters, such as 
love, freedom enhances the value of the act or state. So, a world with the 
more morally excellent creatures having essential PW or essential causal 
PW will not be one in which love is as great in value as in a world in which 
the creatures have free PW, since the love and worship belonging to the 
former creatures would be metaphysically or causally determined and that 
of the latter would be freely given. 
In considering this objection, we must separate some issues. First, I 
whole-heartedly accept and endorse the principle that freely given love, 
worship, trust, and many other states are much more valuable than the deter-
mined version of these states. But second, the argument in its present form 
is flawed, because it assumes that love and worship by creatures that have 
either essential PW or essential causal PW must be metaphysically or causal-
ly determined. In those cases in which love and worship are supererogatory, 
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these creatures could freely love and worship to as great a degree as creatures 
with free PW. Those with essential or causal PW may be determined only 
with respect to moral volitions, and need not be determined with respect to 
supererogatory volitions. So it would seem that the above argument fails. 
However, the above traditionalist argument suggests to me another, 
more powerful argument that must be considered. A Plantingan-style 
argument, involving counterfactuals of nonmoral freedom, could be con-
structed to show that there is some world W (or some initial world segment 
W) in which the most valuable worlds that God has the power to actualize 
are worlds that contain only creatures with free PW, because it just so hap-
pens (due to the counterfactuals of nonmoral freedom that happen to obtain 
in W) that in W all of those possible persons with free PW if created would 
freely love and worship God to a much higher degree than those with essential 
PW or essential causal PW if created would freely love and worship God. 
(This relationship between having free PW and freely loving and worship-
ing God to a higher degree would not be due to the nature of these proper-
ties but could be a pure coincidence.) So, why should we accept the conclu-
sion that essential PW or even essential causal PW is not better than free 
PW? They might be better, and yet God could have a good reason - the 
one just pointed out - to prefer a world of creatures with free PW.18 
I have two replies to this argument. The first is briefly stated. We are 
attempting to deal with the problem of actual moral evil. We are trying to 
understand what could justify the creation of persons like Hitler, Stalin, 
and many, many others, who have performed such horrendous evils that 
they make themselves unworthy of existence. It seems to me quite implau-
sible that, if creatures with essential PW or essential causal PW are by 
virtue of these properties superior to those who have moral freedom, the 
choice of this world with its tremendous moral evils over that of a world W 
of creatures having essential PW or essential causal PW is justifiable on the 
grounds that the love that God receives in this world would be greater 
than the love he would receive from those persons having PW in world W. 
I just cannot believe that a perfect being would allow these moral evils in 
order to receive the extent of love and worship that is actually directed 
toward him by some of his creatures. But if moral freedom renders by its 
nature a vastly more significant life for his creatures than essential PW or 
essential causal PW, then, it seems to me, the choice could be justified.19 
My main reply to this argument is also my second objection in this sec-
tion to the traditional view that God has essential PW rather than free PW 
because essential PW is a greater excellence than free PW. Underlying the 
above argument is the assumption, implicit in the quoted passage by 
Morris, that it really makes perfectly good sense to attribute to God freedom 
with respect to supererogatory acts but determination of the will with 
respect to moral acts, and hence that it can be better for his creatures to be 
free with respect to nonmoral evaluative volitions but better to be meta-
physically or causally determined with respect to moral volitions. I believe 
that this assumption is profoundly mistaken. It seems to me that the tradi-
tional theistic philosopher is deeply conflicted about the value of freedom. 
In his view, it is good for humans to have moral freedom but not good for 
God to have it. Yet, God is said to have freedom regarding nonmoral or 
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supererogatory matters, in granting grace, forgiveness, love, etc. But if it is 
better to have one's moral intentions determined by one's knowledge of the truths of 
morality, then it would be better to have one's supererogatory intentions determined 
by the truths of nonmoral axiology. If it is the determination of the will by moral 
truths that makes the moral volitions more excellent than they would be, it 
should be the case that the determination of the will by nonmoral evaluative 
truths would make the nonmoral volitions more excellent than they would 
otherwise be. For example, if in a particular case it is better to grant forgive-
ness than not, then it would seem that by parity with God's morality it 
would be more excellent for God's will to be metaphysically determined to 
grant forgiveness, in this case by his knowledge that in the particular cir-
cumstances it is better to do so. On the other hand, if the freedom of one's 
nonmoral axiological volitions make them more valuable than they would 
be if determined by nonmoral axiological knowledge, then the freedom of 
one's moral volitions would make them more valuable than they would be 
if determined - by moral knowledge or anything else. There is no basis for 
treating freedom as an excellence in one case and not in the other. The same 
is true of creaturely conformance and divine conformance to the moral law. 
To sum up, then, on the nonAnselmian conception, moral freedom is an 
excellence so great that even a world of creatures who by nature conform 
perfectly to the moral law would not be greater than our world, because of 
our moral freedom. This fact makes the Free Will Defense more plausible 
than it would be on the traditionalist implausible assumptions that moral 
freedom is not an excellence when it comes to God but is when it comes to 
humankind, and that moral freedom would be a defect in God's case but 
nonmoral freedom is an excellence in God's case. 
A total of four reasons in favor of the nonAnselmian view that a perfect 
divine person would have moral freedom has now been presented: (i) that 
the superiority of moral freedom over moral determination makes the Free 
Will Defense against the problem of actual moral evil more plausible, (ii) 
the greatest possible divine autonomy requires full-fledged divine moral 
freedom, (iii) the argument from modal intuitions, and (iv) the argument 
from the parity of the value of moral freedom and nonmoral freedom. I 
believe that the intuitive and epistemic weights of these reasons are accu-
mulative - together they make the case for the nonAnselmian view even 
stronger. Nevertheless, even though I myself find this view of perfection 
overwhelmingly more plausible than the traditional view, I don't think 
that I have proved that the traditional view is false. I don't believe that a 
proof is possible. In fact, I am content to regard my entire effort here as no 
more than the justification of a request, addressed to the traditionalists, that 
they give us an explanation as to (i) what makes essential PW a greater excel-
lence than free PW without also making essential causal PW (and even 
contingent causal PW) a greater excellence than free PW, and (ii) in light of 
and consistent with the answer to (i), what makes freedom regarding non-
moral acts (such as forgiveness) a greater excellence in God's case than the 
metaphysical determination of God's will by his nonmoral axiological 
knowledge. I believe that there is no good explanation that can do it. 
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NOTES 
1. I presented my argument for this conception in "Can Moral Perfection 
be an Essential Attribute?," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. XLVI, 
No.2, December 1985. 
2. I shall use the term 'God' as a name, like 'Yahweh,' and not as a term 
which logically implies that its bearer is a perfect being in all worlds. 
3. This specification is oversimplified in at least two ways. First, a more 
adequate version would use a subjunctive conditional relation in place of the 
material conditional relation implicit in the clause 'whenever x believes ... , x 
wills .... ' Secondly, a more adequate version would eschew quantifying into 
intentional contexts. Simplicity and ease of communication are the motiva-
tions behind the version presented. 
4. As a possible reason to hold that God could not create other omnipo-
tent individuals, one referee suggested an argument that ran basically as fol-
lows. "Suppose that God does create only omnipotent individuals whom he 
foresees will always conform their wills to his. Still, if they are omnipotent, 
they could have willed not to conform their wills to his and, being omnipotent, 
their wills would have been effective. So, there is a possible world in which 
their wills conflict with and thwart God's will. But, as already pointed out in 
the text, a world of this sort is not possible." I believe that this argument fails 
under both of two possible interpretations of it. One reading of "they could 
have willed not to conform their wills to his" would have it that the content of 
their volitions could have been "I will to do what is in conflict with God's voli-
tion." Note that the argument assumes that the will of an omnipotent being is 
always effective. But then an omnipotent being, including God, cannot will to 
do what is impossible; so these omnipotent creatures could not form the voli-
tion in question in any world. ll1e other reading requires a setup: suppose that 
in world W God wills to make event E occur. On the second reading (of 
"could" etc.), each omnipotent creature in W has it in his power to will to pre-
vent E; but this requires only that in some other appropriately close world W* 
the creature effectively wills to prevent E. It must be, however, that in W* God 
does not will to make E occur; he either wills (along with his comrades) to pre-
vent E or abstains from willing with respect to E. It is the truth of the statement 
under this second interpretation that lends the argument an air of plausibility; 
but then the conclusion that there could be no world in which such omnipotent 
creatures exist fails to follow. 
5. For the sake of the thought experiment we assume that if numbers are 
contingent objects, then necessarily, all the numbers exist if any do. 
Alternatively, we could assume that such properties as being less than 7 do not 
require the existence of the contingent objects mentioned in expressions which 
represent them, in this case the number 7. This would be a position analogous 
to one held by those who say that Plato would have had the property of being 
nonidentical to Socrates, even if Socrates had not existed. 
6. Following Plantinga, I use this expression to refer to the state of affairs S 
included in a possible world W such that S includes all states of affairs that are 
not strongly or weakly actualized by God in W. Intuitively put, these are the 
actual states of affairs in W that are ontologically prior to any of God's deci-
sions, such as the necessary states of affairs and the "counterfactuals of free-
dom." The expression in question is a dispensable heuristic device and could 
be replaced with 'world.' 
7. See my "God and Possible Worlds: The Modal Problem of EviL" in 
Nous, Vol. XVII, No.2, May 1983, and my "Can Moral Perfection be an 
Essential Attribute?," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, op. cit. 
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8. In expressions of the sort 'event E1 causes under standard conditions 
event E2' one can either take the phrase 'standard conditions' to be a rigid des-
ignator (possibly involving indexicality), designating the same set of general 
conditions in every world, or one can take the phrase to be nonrigid - in 
which case the predicates in causal expressions of the sort just mentioned will 
pick out different causal properties in different worlds. This difference makes 
no difference to the point I will make about how essential causal PW differs 
from essential PW. Let us just assume the rigid interpretation; thus, 'event E1 
causes under standard conditions event E2' can be taken as elliptical for 'event 
E1 causes under standard conditions C event E2,' where 'C' is a rigid designa-
tor of a set of general conditions. 
9. It must not be assumed that all causal laws are contingent and hence 
under God's control. Consider the proposition that for every individual x and 
every event e, if x is a temporal being and x is omnipotent and x has the power 
to cause e to occur, then x's volition that e occur causes e to occur. This is a nec-
essary truth, but a causal one nonetheless. If such propositions are not true, I 
don't see how a temporal (or atemporal) God could be the cause of anything. 
10. I thank the referee whose comments provided a verbal variant of this 
argument. 
11. This example involves divine promising, but the case can be general-
ized. A creator may incur certain moral obligations just by creating moral crea-
tures and putting them in certain situations. Suppose that God is a temporal 
being who has actualized a situation in which he is morally obligated to do A if 
his creature does B. Then, if God has essential PW, his creature's doing B 
necessitates God's volition to do A. If God is a temporal being, I don't believe 
that the traditionalist can plausibly escape from this conclusion by claiming 
that God makes all of his decisions at the outset, before he creates anyone. In 
the beginning, God may form a conditional volition to do A if the creature does 
B, and God may know that the creature will do B. But it doesn't really make 
sense to say that in the beginning God also forms the categorical volition to do A; 
for example, it doesn't make sense to say that God forgave Luke before Luke 
even existed, a statement which seems to be analytically false, even though he 
may have known beforehand that he would forgive Luke when the time 
arrives. God could have formed earlier the conditional intention to forgive Luke 
when Luke repents, but he had to perform at or after the time that Luke repents 
the categorical volition to forgive Luke. 
12. I have framed the example in terms of a temporal conception of God, 
and without dealing with the issue of how human events fit into divine time. 
But I believe that the basic point remains intact even on an atemporal concep-
tion: on the traditional view of God as having essential PW, an asymmetric 
relation of ontological determination can be shown to hold between certain 
free human decisions and some of God's moral volitions even if God is con-
ceived to be atemporal. There would be a necessitating asymmetric function 
from some free creaturely decisions to some divine moral volitions; there is a 
sense in which the divine volitions would both depend on and be explained by 
the creatures' decisions, even if God is not in time. 
13. In "Can God Change His Mind?," Faith and Philosophy, Vol. 13 No.3, 
July 1996, I explored and defended the conception of a perfect being as having 
both grades of moral freedom. 
14. Robert M. Adams, "Must God Create the Best?," reprinted in The Virtue 
of Faith and Other Essays in Philosophical Theology (New York and Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1987). 
15. I presented a form of this argument in "God and Possible Worlds: The 
Modal Problem of Evil," Nous, op. cit. 
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16. Thomas V. Morris, "Duty and Divine Goodness," American Philosophical 
Quarterly, Vol. 21, No.3 Guly 1984), p. 267. 
17. This is a verbatim comment from one of the referees, except for the 
bracketed inserts. The original comment was directed toward statements 
made in another part of the text; I have taken the liberty to transplant the argu-
ment to the present context. I thank this referee for this argument, which I 
develop into another version in the text below. 
18. This is a powerful type of argument, some versions of which could be 
used to defend the Free Will Defense as a solution to the logical problem of 
moral evil. The objection might be that in any possible initial world segment 
God has the power to create creatures with the more excellent property of essen-
tial PW, or essential causal PW, and thereby avoid all intentional moral evil by 
his creatures. A version of the above argument can be used to reply that the 
overall best worlds that God had the power to actualize (from certain initial 
world segments) may be worlds that contain creatures with moral freedom but 
also with nonmoral freedom, which results in their having a higher degree of 
love and worship than any creature with essential PW or essential causal PW 
would have had. Some of these worlds will contain no horrendous moral evils. 
The higher degree of love and worship may compensate for a certain amount 
of nonhorrendous moral evil and the lack of the presence of the more excellent 
properties of essential PW and essential causal PW. So, even if they contain 
some moral evil, the overall value of these worlds would be greater than any 
that contain only creatures with essential or causal PW which God had the 
power to actualize. And this is consistent with the claim that essential PW 
(and even essential causal PW) is a greater excellence than free PW. 
19. It may be pointed out by the traditionalist that a world with morally 
free creatures could also have supererogatory love among fellow creatures (in 
addition to the supererogatory love of God by creatures and of creatures by 
God), and that some possible worlds containing creatures with essential PW or 
causal PW totally lack all such supererogatory love. This is correct but can be 
misleading if it is taken to suppose that God could be faced with a choice 
between a world of loving, morally free creatures and a world of creatures 
having essential PW or essential causal PW that is totally devoid of creaturely 
love. Surely some very salient types of loving relationships, once entered into, 
are not supererogatory. Once the parent acquires and begins to raise the child, 
the child very much needs not just the care but the love of the parent; does not 
the parent then owe the child love? And when the child is raised by good and 
loving parents, laying the foundation for the happiness of the grown child, 
does not the grown child similarly owe the parents the love that they also need 
from the children whom they love? Even the love of a creature for a good and 
loving Creator may fulfil an obligation rather than be a merely appropriate or 
fitting responsive state. None of this is to deny that love can be simultaneously 
given freely and as fulfillment of a moral obligation. Indeed, my view is that if 
given freely it is much more significant than if given nonfreely. However, a 
world similar to ours but containing only creatures with essential PW or causal 
PW would still contain very substantial cases of loving relationships, even if all 
of them were cases of love that fulfilled an obligation. Such a world couldn't 
lack significant cases of love. 
